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Infinitives are Tenseless 
Susi Wurrnbrand* 
1 Introduction 
This paper argues against the presence of infinitival tense. Infinitives are 
traditionally viewed as tenseless clauses. A common view since Stowell 
(1982), however, holds that there are two types of infinitival complements-
tensed and tenseless infinitives-and that the presence vs. absence of infini-
tival tense correlates with different syntactic structures or properties (see e.g. 
Pesetsky 1992, Pesetsky and Torrego 2004, Bosko vic 1996, 1997, Martin 
1996, 2001, Landau 2000, Wurmbrand 2001). While there is some dis-
agreement about the exact classification of tensed vs. tenseless infinitives 
(see Table 1 below), future irrealis infinitives such as Leo decided to go to 
the party tomorrow are uniformly considered to be tensed infinitives. This 
paper will thus concentrate on future irrealis infinitives and the conclusion 
will be that even these types of infinitives lack semantic tense. 1 
2 Future "Tense" 
To determine the tense properties of future infinitives, I will first summarize 
a standard view on (finite) future statements. Following Abusch (1985) and 
many others, future is not a simple tense but composed of two parts: a true 
tense part, namely present tense (henceforth PRES), plus the abstract modal 
woll which contributes a modal force yielding posteriority (see e.g., 
Thomason 1970, Condoravdi 2001, Copley 2002, Kaufmann 2005 for defini-
tions of woll). Morphologically, PRES + woll is then spelled out as will. The 
composite structure of the future element will is motivated by the following 
properties which I'll summarize in turn: i) the indexical or absolute nature of 
the future and ii) certain sequence of tense (SOT) effects. 
*This paper originated in a seminar taught with Yael Sharvit. For discussion of 
the material presented here, I am grateful to Jonathan Bobaljik, David Pesetsky, Paul 
Portner, Yael Sharvit, as well as the audiences at the workshop New Horizons in the 
Grammar of Raising and Control (LSA Summer Institute 2005), Georgetown Uni-
versity, the Jersey Syntax Circle in Princeton, PLC 30, and WCCFL 25. 
1This seems to be the common (often implicit) assumption in many semantic 
works on infinitives (see for instance see Ogihara 1996, A busch 1997, En~ 2004 ). 
The purpose of this paper is to provide further evidence for lack of tense in infinitives 
and against certain alternative accounts involving infinitival tense. 
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Null Case Pesetsky (& Torrego) Landau!W urmbrand 
Future irrealis [+tense] [+tense] [+tense] 
Implicatives [+tense] [-tense] [-tense] 
try [+tense] [+tense] [-tense] 
Factives [+tense] [-tense] [+tense] 
Propositional [-tense] [-tense] [+tense] 
.. Table 1: Classifications of Infinitives 
As is well-known, English PRES is indexical/absolute in that it must be 
evaluated with respect to the utterance time (En~ 1987, Abusch 1988 et seq., 
Ogihara 1996, Schlenker 1999). This is illustrated by the so-called double 
access reading in (la). Somewhat simplified, in English present-under-past 
contexts, the embedded time (the time of the pregnancy in (la)) must contain 
both the matrix time (the finding out time in (la)) and the utterance time. An 
interpretation where the time of pregnancy overlaps the finding out time but 
does not reach up to the utterance time is impossible (this reading is possible, 
however, in languages where PRES is defined as a relative tense). Impor-
tantly for the purpose of this paper, future contexts show the same absolute 
nature. Examples such as ( 1 b) only allow an interpretation where the embed-
ded time is after the utterance time. An interpretation where the time of 
pregnancy is after the finding out time but before the utterance time is not 
available. The absolute nature of sentences involving will follows straight-
forwardly if it is assumed that will decomposes (syntactically/semantically) 
into two parts, a future modal and an indexical/absolute PRES tense. 
(1) a. Leo found out that Mary is pregnant. 
b. Leo found out that Mary will be pregnant. 
absolute 
absolute 
The second argument for the PRES component of will comes from the 
phenomenon of SOT (see Dowty 1982, Abusch 1988 et seq., Ogihara 1996 
and many others). SOT refers to contexts in which a morphologically real-
ized tense is semantically vacuous. For instance in (2a), the embedded clause 
can receive a "non-past" interpretation-i.e., an interpretation where the 
pregnancy time is not in the past with respect to the finding out time but 
rather overlaps it. I will follow a deletion approach to SOT such as the one 
proposed in Ogihara (1996). According to this view, a tense may delete at 
LF if it is in the scope of another tense with the same value (e.g., the embed-
ded PAST in (2b), which is in the scope of another PAST). Semantically, the 
deleted tense variable then gets bound by a A.-operator (cf. 2c). Following 
Heim (1994), the bound tense variable is then interpreted as a relative "now", 
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which yields the desired simultaneous (i.e. non-past) interpretation in (2) (i.e. 
the pregnancy time will be a "now" relative to Leo's finding out time). 
(2) a. Leo found out that Mary was pregnant 
b. [Leo PAST find out [that Mary PAST be pregnant]] 
c. [Leo PAST find out A.O [Mary 0-be pregnant]] 
Returning to future statements, it has been observed that future contexts 
trigger SOT for embedded PRES. This is illustrated in (3a), which allows 
two temporal interpretations : the time of walking could overlap either the 
utterance time or just the time of seeing. The former interpretation arises if is 
walking is interpreted as PRES (cf. 3b). The latter interpretation, on the other 
hand, shows that the embedded tense is not interpreted as PRES but rather as 
a zero tense (a "now" relative to the time of John's seeing). Assuming that 
future consists of PRES plus woll, it follows without further assumptions that 
(3) is a SOT context-i.e. , a context which allows deletion of the embedded 
PRES tense since it is in the scope of another PRES tense. 
(3) a. John will see the unicorn that is walking. 
b. PRES woll see [NP PRES 
c. PRES woll see [NP PRES 
3 Infinitival Future ::j:. Finite Future 
Ogihara ( 1996:82) 
walk] 
walk] 
As we will see in this and the next section, future infinitives differ crucially 
from finite future statements . The first difference is illustrated by the mini-
mal pairs in (4) and (5): while finite future is absolute (i.e. the time of the 
embedded event must be after the utterance time), infinitival future is rela-
tive-i.e. , the embedded event can occur before the utterance time, as long as 
it is after the time of the matrix event. Note that this property holds in both 
control (cf. 4) and ECM infinitives (cf. 5). 
(4) a. Leo decided a week ago that he will go to the party (*yesterday). 
b. Leo decided a week ago to go to the party yesterday. 
(5) a. According to a report I read last week, it was expected that the 
bridge will collapse (*yesterday). 
b. According to a report I read last week, the bridge was expected 
to collapse yesterday. 
I would like to suggest that the difference between finite and non-finite 
future arises due to the presence (finite) vs. absence (non-finite) of tense. 
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PRES tense in (6a) guarantees that finite future is absolute, whereas the lack 
of tense in (6b) has the effect that non-finite future is relative. 
(6) a. Finite future b. Non-finite future 
TP woi!P 
~ ~ 
~ wo/IP S] ~ w:o/1 vP wil ~ go to the par(v wo/1 vP ~ PRO togo ... 
There are two alternatives to the view that infinitives are tenseless. First, 
one could suggest that future infinitives do involve PRES tense, but that in-
finitival PRES is defined differently than finite PRES (i.e. infinitival PRES 
is relative such as, for instance, PRES in Japanese or Hebrew). Second, one 
could assume that infinitival future does not correspond to will but rather to 
would (Martin 1996, 2001 ). As shown in (7), in contrast to will, would is 
relative in English since it does not require the future event to be after the 
utterance time. The common explanation for this fact is that would is com-
posed of PAST plus woll, and that PAST is relative in English (see Abusch 
1988). In the next section, I will provide evidence against both the presence 
of PRESREL and the presence of a silent would in infinitives. 
(7) a. Kim decided a week ago that she would go to the party 
yesterday. 
b. According to a report I read last week, it was expected that the 
bridge would collapse yesterday. 
4 Sequence of Tense in Infinitives 
The arguments against the alternatives presented above come from SOT in 
infinitives. Let us look in more detail at the conditions under which SOT 
may apply. Following Ogihara (1996), I assume the SOT rule in (8). The 
important part of the SOT rule is the locality condition: essentially, SOT can 
only apply if there is no tense between the trigger and the target of deletion. 
(8) The SOT rule Ogihara (1996:134) 
If a tense feature B is the local tense feature of a tense feature A at 
LF, and A and B are occurrences of the same feature (i.e. either 
[+past] or [+pres]), A and the tense associated with A (if any) are 
optionally deleted. N.B. : (i) The tense features include [+past] and 
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[+pres] and nothing else. (ii) A tense feature A is "in the scope" of a 
tense feature B iff B is associated with a common noun and asym-
metrically c-commands A, orB is associated with a tense or a per-
fect and asymmetrically commands A. (iii) A tense feature B is the 
local tense feature of a tense feature A iff A is "in the scope" of B 
and there is no tense feature C "in the scope" of B such that A is "in 
the scope" of C. 
This locality effect is illustrated in (9) (see Ogihara 1996:93 for a differ-
ent example; to facilitate parsing of these examples I underline the verbal 
elements). Examples such as (9a) do not allow a non-past reading of the 
most deeply embedded clause. More specifically, (9a) cannot have the inter-
pretation: John promised me to say to his mother tomorrow: "We are (now) 
having our last meal together. " Thus, SOT cannot apply in (9a). This fol-
lows from the SOT rule. As shown in (9b), the lowest PAST is not immedi-
ately under the highest PAST; the PRES tense of will intervenes between the 
two PASTs, and therefore SOT is blocked. 
(9) a. John promised me yesterday that he will tell his mother tomor-
row that they were having their last meal together (when ... ). 
b. [PAST promise [PRES woll tell [PAST meal 
4.1 Against a Relative PRES in Infinitives 
Turning to infinitives, we find a crucial difference. The example in (lOa) 
(which differs from (9a) only in that the middle clause is non-finite) allows a 
simultaneous non-past interpretation (see also Ogihara 1996, Abusch 1997, 
En~ 2004 for other examples to the same effect). The interpretation of (lOa) 
can be: John promised me to say to his mother tomorrow: " We are (now) 
having our last meal together. " The assumption that infinitives are tenseless 
(cf. lOb) correctly predicts this interpretation: Since there is no tense inter-
vening between the triggering PAST and the target PAST, the latter can de-
Jete. The resulting interpretation, then, is an interpretation where the time of 
the meal is a "now" relative to John's telling. If, on the other hand, infini-
tives were to involve a relative PRES (cf. JOe), the wrong prediction would 
be made: PRESREL should block SOT in exactly the same way in which 
PRES blocks SOT in (9), which is not the case. 
(10) a. John promised me yesterday to tell his mother tomorrow that 
they were having their last meal together. 
b. [PAST promise [Infmitive 0 woll tell [PAS+ meal 
c. [PAST promise [Infmitive PRESREL woll tell [PAST meal 
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The difference in interpretation in the minimal pair in (9) and ( 10) hence 
provides evidence against the presence of any type of PRES tense in infini-
tives.2 
4.2 Against a Silent would in Infinitives 
Let us now turn to the behavior of would. As noted by Abusch (1988) among 
others, would triggers SOT for embedded PAST. This is illustrated in (11), 
which can have the interpretation: John promised me to say to his mother 
tomorrow: " We are (now) having our last meal together." Since the lowest 
PAST is in the scope of another PAST (the PAST of would), SOT is cor-
rectly predicted to be possible (see (11)). The resulting interpretation is , then, 
one where the time of the meal is a "now" relative to the time of John's tell-
ing (exactly as in (10)). 
(11) a. John promised me yesterday that he would tell his mother tomor-
row that they were having their last meal together. 
b. [PAST promise [PAST woll tell [PAS+ meal 
The situation is, however, more complex in cases involving embedded 
temporal would such as (11). The paraphrase given above for (11) shows that 
the PAST of would is also deleted (i.e. the telling time has to be after the 
promising time). This is, in fact, a general property of temporal would (how-
ever, it is not true for conditional would or would as used in "story-telling" 
contexts such as . .. and then he would drink a whole bottle of milk). The 
examples in (12) further illustrate this. Consider first PAST under PAST 
sentences such as (12a). As pointed out above, these contexts are ambiguous 
between a true PAST interpretation (i.e. a non-SOT interpretation where the 
pregnancy time is before the finding-out time) and a simultaneous non-PAST 
interpretation (i.e. a SOT interpretation where the pregnancy time overlaps 
the finding-out time. Examples such as (12b), on the other hand, which in-
volve would under PAST, only have the non-PAST (SOT) interpretation in 
(12c)-i.e. an interpretation where the pregnancy time is after (due to woll) 
the relative "now" which corresponds to the finding-out time. The sentence 
cannot refer to a situation where the pregnancy is after some time in the 
PAST of the finding-out time but still before the finding-out time (a scenario 
20ne could, of course, define SOT such that PRESREL is somehow exempt from 
the SOT rule. However, this seems to then just restate the fact that infinitival tense is 
invisible (i.e., missing) in all contexts where we would expect a tense to show certain 
effects (i.e., PRESREL would be a vacuous element, a kind of diacritic, the presence of 
which could neither be confrrmed nor disconfirmed). 
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which should be possible if the structure in (12d) were an option). Thus, in 
order to correctly derive the meaning of (12b), PAST must be obligatorily 
deleted. 
(12) a. John found out that Mary was pregnant. SOT/no SOT 
b. John found out that Mary would be pregnant. SOT/*no SOT 
c. [Matrix PAST find out [cp PAS+ woll pregnant SOT 
d.*[Matrix PAST find out [cp PAST woll pregnant *no SOT 
I will thus assume that SOT is obligatory in contexts involving temporal 
(i.e. non-conditional, non-story-telling) would. This assumption is further 
motivated by examples such as (13) , in which temporal would is embedded 
under a non-PAST matrix tense. Crucially, examples of this sort are un-
grammatical (it is again important to point out that this only holds for tempo-
ral would; the sentence is fully grammatical if would is conditional). The 
ungrammaticality of (13) follows from the assumption that would requires 
obligatory SOT. If SOT does not apply, this special requirement of would 
would not be met. However, since (13) is not a SOT environment (PAST is 
under PRES in (13b) and not under PAST as required by the SOT rule), de-
letion is not allowed. Thus, there is no way to satisfy both the special re-
quirement of would and the SOT rule. 
(13) a.*John will promise me tonight that he would tell his mother to-
morrow that. .. [OK if conditional] 
b.*[MatrixPRES woll promise [Infmitive PAST/PAS+ woll tell .. . 
Although an explanation of this special would property is still out-
standing, it seems that for the purpose of this paper it is sufficient to simply 
state it as an assumption. Let us now finally return to infinitives. The exam-
ple in (13) should be contrasted with the example in (14a). Note first that the 
only difference between (13) and ( 14a) is the finiteness of the middle clause. 
Crucially, (14a) is fully grammatical. This fact clearly shows that it cannot 
be assumed that infinitives involve a silent would. If this was the case, it 
would not be clear why (14a) is grammatical in contrast to (13). Moreover, 
the interpretation of ( 14a) indicates once more that there is no tense in these 
infinitives. Examples such as (14a) cannot receive the interpretation: John 
will promise me tonight to say to his mother tomorrow: "We are (now) hav-
ing our last meal together. " Under the assumption that infinitives lack tense, 
(14a), which is schematized in (14b), does not constitute a SOT context. 
Since embedded PAST is not in the scope of another PAST, SOT is correctly 
predicted to be blocked, and hence, (14alb) will only receive a true PAST 
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interpretation. If, on the other hand, infinitives were to involve a silent 
would-i .e., a PAST as in (l4c) (and if one could somehow get around the 
special would-requirement problem), it seems that the prediction would be 
that SOT should be possible since the deepest embedded PAST would be in 
the scope of another PAST. However, this is not correct. 
(14) a. John will promise me tonight to tell his mother tomorrow that 
they were having their last meal together (when ... ). 
b. [PRES woll promise [ 0 woll tell [PAST meal 
c. [PRES woll promise [PAST woll tell [PAS+ meal 
To conclude, the interpretation of the temporal properties of infinitives 
strongly points towards the conclusion that infinitives lack tense. Tenseless 
structures correctly predict that infinitival "tense" is non-deictic/relative and 
that infinitives do not participate in the computation of SOT. 
5 The Syntax of Tenseless Infmitives 
In this section, I will discuss some aspects of the syntax of infinitives and 
provide one further piece of evidence for the lack of a tense domain in (cer-
tain) infinitives.3 The argument will come from the distribution of eventive 
predicates, which have previously been argued to provide evidence in favor 
of infinitival tense (see Boskovic 1996, 1997, Martin 1996, 2001). I will 
show, however, that the arguments presented in the literature are not conclu-
sive, and that on further inspection, the distribution of eventive predicates, in 
fact, provides evidence against infinitival tense. 
As shown in ( 15), eventive predicates (roughly non-stative, individual 
level predicates) are possible in future infinitives such as ( 15a), but not in 
simultaneous infinitives such as (15b). (15b) can only receive a ge-
neric/habitual interpretation; to express an eventive interpretation, the infini-
tive has to be in the progressive form in English (15c)). Following En~ 
(1991), Boskovic (1996, 1997) and Martin (1996, 2001) assume that even-
tive predicates contain an event variable which must be bound by a modal or 
temporal operator other than PRES. The conclusion reached in these works 
is, then, that the difference between (15a) and (15b) is a difference in tense: 
(15a) involves tense whereas (15b) lacks tense.4 
3For reasons of space, I cannot present the full picture here. The reader is re-
ferred to Wurmbrand (2006) for a more elaborate discussion of the syntax of infini-
tives. 
~he authors mentioned in the text also conclude that all control infinitives are 
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(15) a. Leo decided to sing in the shower right then. 
b. Lina believes Leo to sing in the shower (*right now). 
c. Lina believes Leo to be singing in the shower right now. 
Looking more closely at what licenses eventive predicates, however, 
casts some doubt on the conclusion that tense must be present whenever 
eventive predicates are licensed. While it is true that eventive predicates are 
licensed in PAST and future but not in PRES contexts in English (see (16)), 
this does not entail that it is tense that binds the event variable in (l5a) and 
(16c). Assuming that will is composed of PRES+ wall and that, for whatever 
reason, PRES cannot bind the event variable (cf. 16a), the natural conclusion 
is that it is wall that is responsible for the licensing of eventive predicates in 
future contexts. 
(16) a. Leo sings in the shower (*right now). 
b. Leo sang in the shower right then. 
c. Leo will sing in the shower right then. 
PRES:* 
PAST: ./ 
FUT: ./ 
This conclusion, however, means that there is no evidence for tense in 
future infinitives. All we can conclude is that future infinitives involve wall, 
which is what I suggest (cf. 17).5 Note that the distinction between tense and 
wall is not just a notational difference. As we have seen in the previous sec-
tions, the important point is that finite future and infinitival future are differ-
ent in that the latter lacks a crucial part of the future interpretation, namely 
the tense part. 
(17) Leo decided [ wolli [ ei to sing in the shower leventivel 
The assumption that future infinitives involve wall provides a straight-
forward account for the possibility of eventive predicates. What about simul-
tensed (and hence allow eventive predicates) and all ECM/raising infinitives are 
tenseless (and hence prohibit eventive predicates) . However, this is empirically incor-
rect: both types of constructions allow eventive predicates (see the ECM example in 
i.; evidence for the claim that i. is an ECM construction is presented in Wurmbrand 
2005), and both types of constructions prohibit eventive predicates in certain contexts 
(see the control example in ii.). 
i. The printer is expected to work again tomorrow. 
ii . Leo claims to play the Marseillaise (*right now). 
5 An interesting question is whether woll is represented syntactically or whether 
it is simply built into the meaning of the selecting predicate (see for instance Katz 
2001 , 2004). In Wurmbrand (2006), I provide some initial arguments for the syntactic 
presence of woll. 
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taneous infinitives? Although certain simultaneous infinitives (e.g., (l5b) 
and the control example in ii. in fn. 4) indeed prohibit eventive predicates, 
which is correctly predicted if these infinitives lack both tense and wall, this 
is not always the case. Eventive predicates are perfectly fine in infinitives 
combining with implicative predicates such as manage in ( 18a), aspectual 
predicates such as begin (whether control (l8b) or raising (l8c)), and verbs 
like try (l8d). Note that all examples in (18) are incompatible with a future 
interpretation, and hence cannot be assumed to involve wall. 
(18) a. Leo managed to sing in the shower (*tomorrow). 
b. Leo began to sing in the shower (*tomorrow). 
c. The tower began to fall over (*tomorrow). 
d. Leo tried to sing in the shower (*tomorrow). 
Does this mean then that these infinitives involve tense? My answer will 
again be negative. An important generalization about the class of predicates 
in (18) is that these are the typical predicates triggering restructuring or 
clause union in numerous languages (see for instance Rizzi 1978). One ac-
count of restructuring (see Wurmbrand 2001 and references therein), is that 
the transparency effect found in these types of infinitives results from a trun-
cated structure-i.e., restructuring infinitives lack, to different degrees, 
clausal functional projections. I propose to extend this view to the simulta-
neous infinitives in (18). In particular, I suggest that there is a 1:1 syntax-
semantics mapping in that the lack of tense (as argued in the previous sec-
tions) corresponds to the lack of a TP in these infinitives (and, of course, the 
lack of a future orientation corresponds to the lack of a wollP). Hence, these 
infinitives lack the functional domain above the vP (see (19)). 
Under a structure such as (19), there is only one tense domain which is 
"shared" by both the matrix and the embedded predicates. I argue that this 
has (at least) two welcome results. 
(19) TP 
~ 
T __ VP 
~ 
V vP 
manage/try/begin/seem ~ 
PRO/DP l'' 
~ 
to __ _ 
First, as there is no temporal operator in the infinitive, it follows that the 
infinitive receives a simultaneous interpretation. Second, we now have an 
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account of the possibility of eventive predicates in (18): The event variable 
of an embedded eventive predicate can be bound by the matrix tense. This 
makes the following prediction: If the matrix predicate does not involve an 
eventive licenser, embedded eventive predicates should not be licensed. Sur-
prisingly, this is true as shown in (20). 
(20) a. Leo seems to sing in the shower (*right now). 
cf. Leo seems to be singing in the shower right now. 
b. Leo seemed to sing in the shower (right then). 
As shown in (20a), eventive predicates are impossible in a seem context 
when the matrix tense is PRES. If, on the other hand, the matrix tense is 
PAST, an embedded eventive predicate is licensed. This sensitivity of em-
bedded eventive predicates to the type of matrix tense would be quite sur-
prising under an account where the infinitive involves tense: depending on 
what type of tense that would be, it would be predicted that either both cases 
in (20) should be grammatical or both cases should be ungrammatical. The 
tense restructuring account proposed here, on the other hand, correctly pre-
dicts this distribution. Note that the difference between (20a) and (20b) also 
shows that it is unlikely that eventive predicates are licensed by the matrix 
predicates (i.e. by the semantics of try, manage, seem) directly or that there 
is a selectional restriction for stative complements under seem. If one were to 
assume such accounts, it seems that the tense dependency in (20) would 
again be unexpected. Lastly, I would like to mention that the structure in (19) 
provides a straightforward account for a well-known syntactic puzzle con-
cerning raising infinitives. As shown in (21), in there constructions the asso-
ciate of there cannot occur in what is typically assumed to be the embedded 
Spec,TP. There have been many suggestions as to how this fact can be ex-
plained (see for instance Boskovic 2002, who argues that there is no EPP and 
hence no motivation for movement to this position). The structure in (19) 
allows us to view this problem from a different angle: Since there is no TP in 
(21), the question of why there is no movement of a unicorn simply does not 
arise. 
(21) a. There seems to be a unicorn in the garden. 
b.*There seems a unicorn to be in the garden. 
6 Conclusion and Outlook 
In this paper, I have argued that infinitives lack tense, both in syntax and in 
semantics. Assuming this is correct, it is necessary to consider the syntactic 
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properties which have previously been accounted for by reference to infiniti-
val tenserr. Although I cannot provide detailed accounts of these properties 
here, I would like to offer some comments on two "tense" properties. 
First, proponents of the Null Case approach have suggested that the con-
trol vs . ECM/raising distinction correlates with the presence vs. absence of 
tense. However, as pointed out in fn. 4, tense (however defined) does not 
distinguish between control and ECM/raising (see also Battin and Barrett 
2002, Hornstein 2003, Wurrnbrand 2005). The distribution of the temporal 
orientation and eventive predicates is summarized in Table 2 below. As the 
reader can verify, tense cannot be used to delineate the classes of control vs. 
ECM. At this point, it seems that in order to be faithful to the empirical 
situation, we must return to the traditional view, according to which control 
vs. ECM is encoded as a lexicaUselectional property of the matrix predicates. 
k~-~~l!_~~- ~E~?._E~~}~i-~~~~ 
claim (propositional) 
!:.xpec.!_j_~~li~L_ __ . 
decide (irrealis) 
try (irrealis) 
manage (implicative) 
begin (aspectual) 
seem (propositional) 
begin (aspectual) 
ECM 
control 
ECM 
control 
control 
raising 
simultaneous 
future 
simultaneous 
simultaneous 
*eventive 
./ eventive 
./ : matrix PAST 
*· matrix PRES 
./ : matrix PAST 
*· matrix PRES 
Table 2: Distribution of Temporal Orientation and Eventive Predicates 
The second syntactic property I would like to mention here as a property 
that has been attributed to (infinitival) tense is Case. As has been shown in 
Sigurosson ( 1991 ), infinitival PRO subjects receive the same type of Case an 
overt NP would receive in a corresponding finite context. Assuming that 
Case (in particular nominative) requires the presence ofT, these facts pro-
vide evidence for the presence of a syntactic TP in infinitives (which, given 
the discussion in this paper, would need to be semantically vacuous). How-
ever, the view that nominative Case requires the presence of a TP has also 
been challenged, most elaborately in Marantz (1991). Following Marantz ' 
idea that case is not a structural relation but, rather, determined post-
syntactically by various morphological realization rules, McFadden (2004) 
proposes an account of case in infinitives which does not require a structural 
relation with T. If this approach is correct, case does not pose a problem for 
the view presented here, and the assumption that infinitives lack tenseffP 
can be maintained, thus allowing a transparent syntax-semantics mapping. 
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As for other properties (e.g., restructuring vs. no restructuring, the dif-
ference between exhaustive and partial control (Landau 2000) ; certain dif-
ferences between realis and irrealis infinitives (Pesetsky 1992, Pesetsky and 
Torrego 2004)), the idea would be that these phenomena are indeed, as these 
authors suggest, related to different structures of the constructions under 
consideration. The differences, however, are not encoded as [±tense] . Rather, 
the features involved are [±woll] or the presence or absence of irrealis aspect 
(recall that although this paper claims that infmitives lack tense, this does not 
mean that all infinitives have the same structure-as pointed out above, 
some infinitives project woll while others don' t) . Although some initial 
thoughts along these lines are provided in Wurmbrand (2006), detailed pro-
posals still have to await further research. 
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